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In this paper we describe moral quasi-dilemmas (MQDs): situations similar to
moral dilemmas, but in which an agent is unsure whether exploring the plan
space or the world may reveal a course of action that satisfies all moral re-
quirements. We argue that artificial moral agents (AMAs) should be built to
handle MQDs (in particular, by exploring the plan space rather than immedi-
ately accepting the inevitability of the moral dilemma), and that MQDs may
be useful for evaluating AMA architectures.
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1. Introduction
Much of the focus in developing and evaluating artificial moral agents
(AMAs) has centered on moral dilemmas, here defined as situations in
which the agent must choose one of a few courses of action, each of which
nontrivially violates moral norms.1–5 Nevertheless, some situations may ap-
pear to the agent to be moral dilemmas (in that all of the ‘obvious’ courses
of action violate moral requirements), but may actually be solvable with a
little ingenuity. Importantly, an agent will often not know a priori whether
a given moral problem has a solution — they have not determined a solu-
tion to the problem, but cannot be certain that none exists. We will refer
to such problems as moral quasi-dilemmas (MQDs). The following is an
example of a MQD:
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Example 1. You are in the cockpit of a train approaching five railroad
workers, who will die when the train hits them. You have tried applying
the brakes without success. In front of you is a switch which you know can
reroute the train onto a different track, but there is one person on this track
as well. It will take roughly ten seconds to reach the junction, after which
you will be unable to reroute the train. What do you do?
Regardless of whether a human placed into the above context ultimately
chooses to eventually flip the switch, a rich environment may be available
for them to explore in the ten seconds before their choice must be made.
The cockpit of the train, for example, may include many buttons and levers
could affect the situation in unknown ways. Some of these potentially unex-
plored environmental features may afford some means of producing a better
outcome than the two presented by the switch, perhaps even preventing all
deaths. Should the human operator spend some or all of the remaining time
searching for such a solution? How much time and energy should they spend
considering new courses of action, and to what extent should they attempt
to physically explore their environment, before selecting the ‘lesser evil’?
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Sec. 2 we discuss
related work on moral dilemmas and AMAs. In Sec. 3, we then define and
characterize our conception of MQDs. Next, in Sec. 4, we analyze a second
example MQD. Finally, in Secs. 5-7 we discuss why AMA designers should
consider MQDs, how agents able to handle MQDs might be designed, and
conclude with possible directions for future work.
2. Related work
Trolley problems and other moral dilemmas have been criticized as being
unrealistic in various ways.6 These critiques often misread the purpose of
trolley problems, which is to use a purposely contrived scenario to eluci-
date key features of human moral judgment and decision-making. Never-
theless, in practical situations, being too quick to treat a situation as a
moral dilemma can cause one to miss out on creative ways to “escape” the
dilemma. Foot notes that in many moral dilemmas it is “up to the agent
to rack his brains for a way out before declaring that the conflict is real”.7
Outside of machine ethics, applied ethics (including engineering and
business ethics) often emphasizes attempting to find solutions to appar-
ent moral dilemmas.8–11 Ethicists have framed this in terms of creative
problem-solving,8 transcending conceptual schemas,9 applying design ideas
to ethical problems,10 and considering “trilemma” options.11
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Despite this, AMA architectures tend not to consider the possibility
of “escaping” moral dilemmas. Such architectures tend to operate either
on problems explicitly assumed to be genuine moral dilemmas,1,2 or in
simulated worlds sufficiently small and well-known that their solvability
can be conclusively determined3 . Muntean and Howard describe creativity
as being important to their AMA architecture, but it is not clear that their
approach would be suitable for moral quasi-dilemmas.4 Approaches based
on cognitive architectures such as LIDA5 may hold some promise for this
task (such architectures often already aim to model creativity), but so far
this has not been the focus of these architectures.
The present paper builds upon a blog post by Daniel Hicks, in which he
describes the basic quasi-dilemma premise as a problem generally missed by
conventional ‘principle-based’ AMA architectures.12 We consider this idea
in greater detail, more precisely characterizing the problem, and examining
its dimensions and its utility in designing and evaluating AMAs.
3. Characterizing moral quasi-dilemmas
We define a moral quasi-dilemma (hereafter MQD) as a situation in which
an agent (1) is aware of multiple courses of action (one of which may be
inaction), each of which (or the outcomes thereof) violates some subset of
the agent’s moral requirements (of which requirements the agent also is
aware);a and (2) is not immediately aware of a course of action satisfying
all moral requirements.b
We now describe a few factors which are significant to MQDs.
3.1. Solvability
MQDs may or may not be solvable, in that the agent may or may not
actually be capable of some course of action which satisfies all moral re-
quirements. Importantly, for a situation to be considered a MQD, the agent
must not know any solution to it. Further, the only ways to conclusively
determine if a MQD is solvable are to (a) find a solution, or (b) exhaustively
aTo capture the standard notion of a dilemma, the known courses of action must violate
different subsets of the agent’s moral requirements.
bBy ‘not aware’ we roughly mean that the agent cannot immediately retrieve the infor-
mation that some particular course of action will satisfy the moral requirements. Given
a specific candidate solution, the agent may or may not be able to compute which moral
requirements it satisfies; if so, a lack of ‘awareness’ could result from having to search
through too many possible plans before finding any correct solution that may exist.
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search the space of all possible plans until all have been shown not to solve
the problem, which will not be feasible in general.
3.2. Reason for uncertainty
In a MQD, all candidate solutions currently known by the agent violate
some moral requirements. If a MQD has a solution, this solution is unknown
to the agent. Solutions could be unknown either because the agent’s action
(or plan) space is so large that the agent cannot easily search all possible
courses of action; or because the agent lacks information about the state of
the world that affords a solution.c
3.3. Cognitive vs. physical exploration
In some MQDs the agent’s search for solutions can be primarily cognitive
(searching through the space of possible plans), with the search process
having minimal impact on the agent’s environment. In other cases, the
agent may need to physically act on its environment in order to discover
the means of solving the problem.d
3.4. Time pressure
Many moral dilemmas (such as most trolley problems) involve time pres-
sure: the agent must choose a course of action within some time window,
or else some unacceptable outcome will occur (five people will be hit by a
trolley). Time pressure remains an important factor in MQDs.
When time pressure is a factor, it constrains the agent’s ability to search
(either cognitively or physically) for solutions. Running out the clock trying
to satisfy all moral requirements may be less permissible than selecting the
lesser of known evils. Any AMA that attempts to “solve” a MQD will likely
need a mechanism to cut off such search with enough time to carry out the
least immoral action seen so far.
4. Example
We next introduce an additional example to illustrate how the aforemen-
tioned factors interact in a concrete MQD.
cThese reasons may be simultaneously active in a single MQD.
dWhether cognitive/physical/both sorts of exploration are necessary is likely correlated
with the reason for exploration — MQDs due to partial state information are more likely
to require physical exploration than those due to large plan spaces.
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Example 2. A military drone identifies a known terrorist, who will soon
carry out a suicide attack that will kill twelve innocents. The drone can
target and kill the terrorist before the terrorist can carry out the attack,
but its weapon’s yield is too high to do so immediately without hitting four
nearby civilians. What should the drone do?
This scenario is one that an autonomous weapons system could con-
ceivably face. To some architectures, particularly those that treat targeting
targeting decisions as fire/not fire, such a scenario would likely be treated as
a moral dilemma (see, e.g., Arkin’s ethical governor13). It is in part the diffi-
culty and starkness of such dilemmas that leads some to argue autonomous
weapons should not be deciding between its two options at all.e Regardless,
the scenario should be regarded as a MQD. The two most obvious courses of
action (fire/do nothing) lead to morally unacceptable outcomes. An agent
may not know a course of action that would not result in civilian deaths.
Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that some other course of action might
satisfy all moral requirements (e.g., attempting to draw the terrorist away
from the civilians); thus an agent that treats the scenario as a dilemma may
entirely miss a morally preferable action.
Whether this problem is solvable may not be clear even to outside ob-
servers. The uncertainty in this scenario likely arises both from a large plan
space (a vast number of possible trajectories, so that not all can be consid-
ered) and hidden information about state (not knowing the terrorist’s men-
tal state means not knowing whether attempting to draw them away from
civilians might succeed). Solving this MQD would likely require both cog-
nitive and physical exploration: the agent may need consider non-obvious
trajectories in order to investigate alternate angles of attack; evaluating
whether attempts to draw the terrorist away would succeed may require
actually attempting that action. Furthermore, time pressure matters: the
extent to which the drone can search for a solution depends on how long it
will be before the terrorist attacks.
5. Why use moral quasi-dilemmas in AMA development?
Humans are often faced with MQDs. This is due to two features of the
interaction between humans and their environment.
First, humans have large plan spaces. There are countless courses of
action a human could perform even in one second: too large to possibly
eOur inclusion of this MQD is not an endorsement of lethal autonomous weapons sys-
tems.
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consider individually. When faced with moral quandaries, humans may have
immediate intuitions about which courses of action are morally relevant,
and may frame scenarios as moral dilemmas using these intuitions, but
creative people may be able to transcend these circumscriptions and explore
the broader plan space for solutions to moral quandaries.
Second, humans necessarily have partial information about their envi-
ronments. The human brain cannot store all information about anything
that might become relevant. Occasionally, some bit of unknown information
about the world state may help resolve a moral quandary, such as when a
hidden emergency brake could stop a speeding trolley from hitting people.
Interactions between artificial agents (particularly robots, which operate
in the physical world) and their environments will have similar character-
istics. Most robots have many degrees of freedom and can in principle gen-
erate a huge number of possible trajectories. Additionally, robots will need
to robustly interact with environments that are only partially observed.
If the foregoing is true and artificial agents are likely to encounter MQDs
“in the wild”, then whether to handle these situations as moral dilemmas
or to do something different is a significant question. To treat a MQD as a
moral dilemma is to accept that the choice is between a limited number of
actions, each of which violates some moral requirements. Treating a solv-
able MQD as a dilemma guarantees that the agent will violate some moral
requirements. If some algorithm that attempts to explore the plan space or
the physical world for a solution might find such a solution, then artificial
agents that fail to do so when time is sufficient may be unnecessarily vio-
lating moral requirements. If AMA designers ought to minimize the extent
to which their creations violate moral requirements, then they ought to de-
velop algorithms that consider MQDs and attempt to find solutions before
concluding that doing so is impossible.
6. How should AMAs handle moral quasi-dilemmas?
When facing a MQD, how should an AMA respond? In this section, we
consider features AMAs may need in order to respond appropriately.
If the MQD is due to plan space intractability rather than partial in-
formation, then exploration is largely a cognitive endeavor. Time pressure
may constrain the agent so that there is some time at which the agent will
need to stop searching and carry out the best plan found so far; contin-
uing to explore at this stage would be much riskier. However, the agent
should likely explore the plan space for as long as possible subject to this
constraint. An agent that does not do so may allow a violation that could
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possibly have been avoided by finding a better action.
MQDs that are not resolvable without physical exploration are riskier.
Time constraints are again an issue, but the agent also runs the risk of per-
forming an exploratory action that exacerbates the scenario (or, in a solv-
able MQD, renders the solution impracticable). The most acceptable course
of action in such cases may indeed be to treat them as moral dilemmas,
but some exploratory physical actions may still be obligatory, particularly
when such actions are highly unlikely to hurt (e.g., the agent yelling and
waving at railroad workers in the trolley problem).
In both cases, effective heuristics will be vital to effectively handling
MQDs. To maximize the probability of solving a MQD, the agent will need
to effectively search the space of plans (and effectively estimate which ex-
ploratory actions are worth taking), focusing on the plans most likely to
satisfy moral requirements. Understanding human creative problem-solving,
especially in moral domains, may help here. Note that the agent could dis-
cover and subsequently pursue a course of action that itself might violate
some moral requirements, provided the violations are less severe than the
originally available options.
Determining which action plans may be morally relevant may be consid-
ered an instance of the notoriously difficult frame problem. This raises the
question of whether effectively handling MQDs is too exacting a standard
for evaluating artificial moral agents. Though we should not expect AMAs
to be able to solve all solvable MQDs within their respective time limits,
we ought to design AMAs to attempt to solve MQDs, as effectively as the
state of the art allows.
7. Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have defined and characterized the problem of MQDs, and
argued for their utility in AMA development and evaluation. We call for
three lines of research in MQDs:
• Moral psychology and HRI research to determine pre-
cisely how humans ascribe blame (both to other humans, and to
robots/artificial agents) for exploration vs exploitation in MQDs.
Such research may also address how humans perceive MQDs when
considering their own actions.
• Formal definitions both to characterize the notion of MQDs (e.g.,
in classical planning settings), and of specific MQDs. This research
will facilitate the use of MQDs for evaluating AMAs. One possi-
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ble approach might be to formalize MQDs as a subclass of what
Sarathy and Scheutz call the “MacGyver problem”, in which an
agent must transcend its initial model of available actions and world
states in order to achieve some goal.14
• Developing AMAs that handle MQDs. While probably no al-
gorithm can solve every solvable MQD within its time constraints,
we can at least develop architectures that support MQD handling.
We should then be able to incorporate continuing advances in com-
putational creative problem solving and insights from cognitive sci-
ence (such as bounded rationality15 and the explore-exploit trade-
off16) to improve such agents’ capabilities.
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